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We note some problems in Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and suggest a way to
maintain the key insight of that paper, which is that a demand for fairness could lead
to di⁄erent economic systems such as those observed in France versus the US (multiple
equilibria).
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1 Introduction
In an important paper Alesina and Angeletos (2005), henceforth AA, argued that a preference
for fairness could lead two identical societies to choose di⁄erent economic systems. In partic-
ular, two equilibria might arise: one with low taxes and a belief that the income-generating
process is ￿fair￿because e⁄ort is important (an ￿American￿equilibrium) and another with
high taxes and the belief that the process is ￿unfair￿because luck prevails. Piketty (1995)
had shown that a similar pattern could arise from standard preferences if initial beliefs about
the relative importance of e⁄ort and luck in generating income was di⁄erent in the two so-
cieties, while Benabou and Tirole (2006) study this issue using more realistic preferences
(Buera et al, 2010, provides a discussion of the evolution of beliefs about economic systems).
A key contribution of AA is to obtain these two equilibria from identical societies assuming
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1agents prefer outcomes that are fair, an important modi￿cation because fairness considera-
tions seem central in the demand for redistribution and because in some settings (as in some
ultimatum games) such preferences for fairness can lead to large (material) ine¢ ciencies.
In this note we discuss some aspects of AA. Our main point is that the way AA specify
￿fair￿preferences (equation 3 in page 965 of AA) has unappealing implications. First, in
some situations there is multiplicity and demand for redistribution even if luck plays no role
(and the prevailing level of income is ￿fair￿ ). In other words, there is multiplicity even if the
equilibrium tax rate is independent of the signal to noise ratio (a quantity that expresses
how important is e⁄ort, relative to luck, in the determination of income). This con￿ icts with
the notion that the signal to noise ratio plays a central role in generating multiplicity with
AA preferences for fairness. Second, if one de￿nes ￿fairness￿in a way that is consistent with
their verbal description, the AA model no longer has multiplicity.1
Our ￿nal contribution is to show that the central idea in AA, namely that a demand
for fairness can lead similar societies to have di⁄erent equilibrium tax rates, can indeed be
obtained in at least one speci￿cation of fair preferences. In particular, we study agents
for whom a desire for fairness is reduced to a desire to respond like with like, as in the
reciprocal altruism preferences of Levine (1998) and Rotemberg (2003) (see their papers for
a discussion on how the empirical ￿t of these preferences improves upon alternative theories).
In this alternative model, we obtain multiplicity: two identical societies can have di⁄erent
equilibrium tax rates.
2 The AA Model.
The economy is populated by a measure 1 continuum of individuals i 2 [0;1], who live for
two periods: in the ￿rst period the individuals accumulate capital; in the middle of their
lives the taxes are set; in the second period, individuals exert e⁄ort (work). Total pre-tax
lifetime income
yi = Ai [￿ki + (1 ￿ ￿)ei] + ￿i (1)
1There are minor technical changes that need to be made in AA to obtain the main result, even if one keeps
their de￿nition of fairness. In particular, in the appendix we show that by simply adding the assumption of
symmetric shocks, one can then prove that the tax rate preferred by the median voter is a Condorcet winner
(i.e., it beats any other tax rate in pairwise voting; this approach is less elegant but is required because the
median voter does not apply as preferences are not single peaked, even with symmetric shocks). However,
some of the appeal of AA is lost, since then the model cannot capture the Meltzer-Richard e⁄ect that the
authors discuss.
2is where A is talent, k is the capital accumulated during the ￿rst period, e is e⁄ort during
the second period, ￿ is ￿noise￿or ￿luck￿ , and ￿ 2 (0;1) is a technological constant. The
government imposes a ￿ at tax rate ￿ on income and redistributes the proceeds in a lump
sum fashion, so that the individual￿ s consumption is, for government transfer G = ￿
R
i yi;
ci = (1 ￿ ￿)yi + G:
Individual preferences are, for ui = Vi (ci;ki;ei) = ci ￿ 1
2￿i [￿k2
i + (1 ￿ ￿)e2
i];











where ui is private utility from own consumption, investment and e⁄ort, ￿i is an impatience
parameter, ￿ is ￿distaste for unfair outcomes￿and ￿ is a measure of the social injustice
in the economy. AA assume that A;￿ and ￿ are iid across agents, and that for ￿ = A2￿;
Cov (￿;￿) = 0: We let ￿ be the mean of ￿; and ￿m its median; AA also assume ￿ = ￿￿￿m ￿ 0
and normalize ￿m = 2: Similarly, ￿ is the mean of ￿ and ￿m its median. We assume in
addition that ￿ and ￿ are independent (the joint probability distribution is the product of
the probability distributions of ￿ and ￿), and that their distributions are symmetric (see the
appendix).




(ui ￿ b ui)
2
where ui is the actual level of private utility, and b ui is a measure of the ￿fair￿level of utility
the individual should have (deserves) on the basis of his talent and e⁄ort. They de￿ne
b ui = Vi (b ci;ki;ei) for
b ci = b yi = Ai [￿ki + (1 ￿ ￿)ei]: (2)
The individual chooses k when taxes haven￿ t been set, so anticipating a tax rate of ￿e
(which will be equal to the actual ￿ in equilibrium) he maximizes











with respect to k; and using the actual tax rate in equation (3) maximizes with respect to e
to obtain
ki = (1 ￿ ￿e)Ai￿i and ei = (1 ￿ ￿)Ai￿i: (4)
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33 Fairness in AA
AA de￿ne unfairness in the economy as sum of the di⁄erences between what people get, ci;
and what people ￿deserve￿ , b ci. In the words of AA, ￿Following the evidence ... that people
share a common conviction that one should get what one deserves, and deserve what one
gets, we de￿ne our measure of social injustice as￿￿ = V ar(ci ￿ b ci). That is, in going from
what one gets, ci; to what one deserves, b ci; AA change two things: the fact that there is
a government, and the fact that there is an unfair luck shock in the economy.2 With this
de￿nition of fairness, they ￿nd that there are two equilibria, the American with low taxes,
and the European, with high taxes. They claim that this is the result of the demand for
fairness, and:
￿if the demand for fairness is su¢ ciently high, the complementarity between the optimal
level of taxation and the equilibrium signal-to-noise ratio in the income distribution can
sustain multiple equilibria.￿
￿The critical features of the model that generate equilibrium multiplicity are (a) that
the optimal tax rate is decreasing in the signal-to-noise ratio and (b) that the equilibrium
signal-to-noise ratio is in turn decreasing in the tax rate.￿
To show that multiplicity in AA arises, not because of luck and unfairness, but because
of the elimination of Government from the de￿nition of fairness, we now show that:
1. In an economy with no unfairness, with luck shocks identically 0; the AA de￿nition
of unfairness (which excludes government and luck from fair consumption) gives rise
to multiplicity, so it is not unfairness, or the demand for fairness, that gives rise to
multiplicity. In fact, in order to illustrate the main point of this section, that the AA
de￿nition of fairness is inconsistent with ￿true￿fairness, we show that this quote (p.
970) is problematic: ￿the US and EU-type equilibria coexist as long as ￿ is su¢ ciently
high and ￿￿ is neither too large nor too small relative to ￿￿. Instead ... only the low-tax
regime survives if there is ... little noise to correct (low ￿￿).￿Moreover, they claim in
2Di Tella, Dubra and MacCulloch (2010) mention this di¢ culty and propose an alternative model based
on the de￿nition of fairness we introduce in this section, while Alesina et al. (2010) study the dynamic
implications of using the preferences of AA and those of Di Tella et al. (2010). Alesina et al. clarify that
the de￿nition of fairness in AA is indeed not only about fairness, but about other things as well, since it
re￿ ects the fact ￿that individuals tolerate inequality coming from innate ability and e⁄ort, but are averse to
inequality arising from everything else, luck and redistribution￿ .
4p. 970, ￿The critical features of the model that generate equilibrium multiplicity are
(a) that the optimal tax rate is decreasing in the signal-to-noise ratio and (b) that the
equilibrium signal-to-noise ratio is in turn decreasing in the tax rate.￿The following
example has a constant noise-to-signal ratio (at 0), but there is still multiplicity: hence
it is not the variation in signal to noise ratio that generates multiplicity, but the
exclusion of government from the de￿nition of fair consumption.
2. If fair consumption is de￿ned as the consumption individuals would have in the presence
of a government, but luck shocks are identically 0 so that income is fair, c
g
i = (1 ￿ ￿)b yi+








then, there is no multiplicity of equilibria (in two identical countries 1 and 2, if the tax
rate are ￿1;￿2 2 (0;1); then ￿1 = ￿2)
With ￿m = ￿ = 2; and ￿ = ￿m = 0 and ￿ = 2; plus ￿2
￿ = 1 and ￿￿ = 5
2; the economy
has multiple equilibria, if fair, deserved, consumption is de￿ned as b ci (no government, no





















e + 25￿￿e ￿ 30￿ + 4
When we set ￿e = ￿, the equation has 3 roots:







However, imagine that in this same economy, luck shocks were identically 0; so that
￿2
￿ = 0: In this case, there is still multiplicity, but it is not a consequence of the ￿demand
5for fairness￿ , since this economy is fair. In an economy with no unfairness, we still get
multiplicity, if we use the AA de￿nition of fairness, with ￿2









2 + 75￿￿e ￿ 150￿ + 25￿
2
e ￿ 100￿e + 104
￿
;
so setting the same parameter values as before, we see that there are 3 equilibrium tax rates:
13
15; 4
5;0: Just to repeat ourselves, in this economy, the noise to signal ratio is V ar(yi ￿ b yi)=V ar(b yi) =
0 (independently of the tax rate) but there are three equilibria. Hence, even with no unfair-
ness, there is multiplicity.
Finally, if in any of the two economies (with ￿2
￿ = 1 or ￿2
￿ = 0) we de￿ne fair consumption
as that which would arise with government but with no shocks, that is c
g
i, what we argue
is a reasonable de￿nition of fairness, there is uniqueness of equilibria (this is true generally,
and not only for these two economies). For a proof of the following result, see the appendix.
Theorem 1 There is a unique equilibrium tax rate when unfairness is de￿ned as ￿g =
V ar(ci ￿ c
g
i):
Proof. See the Appendix.
This proves that it is not demand for fairness that generates multiplicity (de￿ning fair
consumption as that which would arise if income had no luck shocks yields uniqueness) but
the fact that ￿fair￿consumption does not include taxes and transfers (as shown by the fact
that in an economy with no luck shocks there is still multiplicity).
One could try to ￿￿x￿ the model in AA by changing the de￿nition of fairness ￿ to
some measure of the distance between ci and c
g




is, in the population. Although some alternative de￿nitions of ￿ do work, they are quite
complicated, which may be interpreted as indicating that the basic model is not robust to
slight (or reasonable) changes in the de￿nition of ￿.
4 A model of fairness
There is a continuum mass m < 1 of ￿rms that behave competitively (they take prices as
given). In period 0; ￿rms observe a cost realization ￿ ￿ U [0;1]; and they have three actions
available to them: play out, play g (produce a single unit of a good quality product), or
play b (produce a single unit of a bad quality product). Quality is observable. The cost of
producing the bad quality is cb +￿; while that of the good quality is cg +￿ for cg > cb. The
6timing of when they observe their cost is irrelevant: they can observe it before or after entry.
We have assumed that they observe it before entry.
There is a continuum mass 1 of consumers, and in period 1; after ￿rms have entered,
entrepreneurs (the owners of the ￿rms) and consumers must vote for a tax rate ￿ on sales,
that is distributed lump sum to consumers (assuming that it is distributed to all does not
change the qualitative features of the model).
In period 2 consumers learn their valuations for the goods, and decide whether to buy
(at the prices which are given) one single unit of the good (among the available options,
which can be both goods, only g or only b) or none. If a consumer buys good i; for i = b;g;
with price pi; his utility increases, for some ￿ ￿ U [0;1], by i￿ ￿ pi: Whereas several well-
known models in economics analyze fairness, including Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), Falk and Fischbacher (2006), inter alia, we follow Levine (1998) and Rotemberg
(2008) and assume an individual￿ s kindness towards others depends on their estimation of
how kind others have been in relationships with them. In particular, we assume that our
consumers have Rotemberg preferences and sometimes reject the hypothesis that the ￿rm
was ￿minimally altruistic￿towards them (and chosen a good quality product). In that case,
the utility of the ￿rm enters negatively in the consumers￿utility (see Rotemberg and Levine,
who explain that these preferences better account for the patterns in the data emerging from
ultimatum experiments).
Consumer utility is for government transfers G; and pro￿ts P of the bad quality ￿rm,
not buy buy good i
angry G ￿ ahP i￿ ￿ pi + G ￿ ahP
not angry G ￿ alP i￿ ￿ pi + G ￿ alP
Standard preferences are with ah = al = 0: We will assume for the parametrizations that
ah > 0 = al:
A strategy for ￿rm j is a function ￿j from type to fOut;b;gg; and a voting rule vj at
each node (each con￿guration of entry of ￿rms) that maps type into [0;1]; specifying the
tax rate voted by the entrepreneur who owns ￿rm j:
A strategy for consumer i is function from nodes to [0;1], specifying the tax rate he votes
in each node, and a purchase decision that depends on his preference parameter ￿; the chosen
tax t; and the prices of the two goods in that node.
An equilibrium in this economy is a strategy for each ￿rm, a strategy for each consumer,
such that:
Given an expected tax rate te; and expected prices pb and pg; the entry decisions by ￿rms
7are optimal; each consumer and entrepreneur votes for his/her optimal tax rate knowing how
taxes a⁄ect the equilibrium price; the tax rate t voted by the majority is t = te; at prices pe
i,
i = b;g; supply equals demand; given the actual tax rate t; and prices pb and pg; purchase
decisions by consumers are optimal.
Theorem 2 There exists an open set of parameters for which there are two equilibria in
pure strategies with the following features. In one equilibrium, ￿rms expect a high tax rate
tb; those that enter, do so with the bad quality product, and in equilibrium, consumers vote
for the tax rate tb. In the other equilibrium, ￿rms expect a low tax rate tg < tb; and those
that enter do so with a product of good quality, and in equilibrium consumers vote for a low
tax rate tg:
Proof. We construct the equilibrium starting from the last stage, when ￿rms have
entered, and the tax rate has been set. Suppose only ￿rms of type i have entered the market





i 0 ￿ pi < i
0 i ￿ pi
:
If the price is pi; and only i ￿rms are in, each ￿rm supplies 1 unit of the good, if and only if








(1 ￿ t)pi ￿ ci
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m((1 ￿ t)pi ￿ ci)
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1+im(1￿t) ti ￿ t ￿
i￿ci
i ￿ ti
i ti < t
: (6)
Given this equilibrium price as a function of the tax, consumers and entrepreneurs must vote
for their preferred tax rate. We concentrate on the voting behavior of the consumers, since
that decides the chosen tax rate, given that there are more consumers than entrepreneurs
(because 1 > m) and all consumers have the same preferences at the voting stage.
For a = ah;al; consumer utility for type ￿; when ￿rms are of type i = b;g; is given by
u = maxfi￿ ￿ pi;0g + G ￿ aP:
8So for ￿i =
pi























+ G ￿ aP:
(a) (This case is irrelevant since for all parameter values we have ti < 0). For t < ti;





+ tpi ￿ a
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+ tpi ￿ a
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+ (1 + a)i(1 ￿ m)t ￿ a
￿




which is increasing in t; so the optimal t for consumers will never be t < ti:
(b) For ti ￿ t ￿ ti; pi =
i(mci+1)
1+im(1￿t) and pro￿ts are, for ￿i ￿
(1￿t)i(mci+1)
1+im(1￿t) ￿ ci the largest





(1 ￿ t)i(mci + 1)
1 + im(1 ￿ t)





(ci ￿ i(1 ￿ t))
2
(1 + im(1 ￿ t))
2
Government transfers are then
Gi = m
it(mci + 1)(i(1 ￿ t) ￿ ci)
(im(1 ￿ t) + 1)
2





2 (ci ￿ i(1 ￿ t))
2
(im(1 ￿ t) + 1)
2 + m
it(mci + 1)(i(1 ￿ t) ￿ ci)




(ci ￿ i(1 ￿ t))
2
(1 + im(1 ￿ t))
2
= m
it(mci + 1)(i(1 ￿ t) ￿ ci)
(im(1 ￿ t) + 1)
2 +
(im2 ￿ a)(ci ￿ i(1 ￿ t))
2
2(1 + im(1 ￿ t))
2






(im(1 ￿ t) + 1)
3
￿
(m + a)(i ￿ ci) ￿ i
￿
cim




which is positive for small t; 0 for
0 < ti =
(m + a)(i ￿ ci)
ai + 2im + im2ci
< ti (7)
and then negative.
(c) For t > ti =
i￿ci
i ; pi = i; G = Pi = 0; and utility is 0:
9A parameter con￿guration: b = 2;g = 4;cb = 0;cg = 2
3;m = 2
3;ah = 1;al = 0:
Suppose ￿rms expect a tax rate of tb = 5
7; and prices of pb = 42
29 and pg = 41
11: Then, a ￿rm
prefers to enter with b rather than g if and only if




which in this case is satis￿ed (with strict inequality). All ￿rms with
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ tb)pb ￿ cb =
12
29
enter the market, generating a supply of m times 12
29; which in this case is 8
29:
Given prices, consumers with ￿ ￿
pb
b = 21
29 are better o⁄ buying than not buying b; and
consumers prefer b to g if and only if
b￿ ￿ pb ￿ g￿ ￿ pg , pg ￿ pb ￿ (g ￿ b)￿





Finally, given that tb is determined by equation (7), we see that the proposed pro￿le of
strategies is an equilibrium. To see that this is an equilibrium for an open set of parameters,
note that the incentive constraints are satis￿ed with strict inequalities. So setting pb with
equation (6), pg = 41
11 and tb with equation (7), we continue to obtain an equilibrium.
Consider now the equilibrium with low taxes. Suppose ￿rms expect a tax rate of tg = 15
44;
and prices of pb = 55
51 and pg = 44
21: A ￿rm prefers to enter with g rather than b if and only if






which in this case is satis￿ed with strict inequality. All ￿rms with
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ tg)pg ￿ cg =
5
7
enter the market, generating a supply of m times 5
7; which in this case is 10
21:
Given prices, consumers with ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
pg
g = 11
21 are better o⁄ buying than not buying g;
since this consumer prefers g to b; because 0 > b￿ ￿pb; all types ￿
0 > ￿ also do. In addition,
types ￿ < ￿ are such that 0 > b￿ ￿ pb > b￿ ￿ pb so they don￿ t buy b either.
Demand is then 1 ￿
pg
g = 1 ￿ 11
21 = 10
21; which equals supply.
As in the other equilibrium, given that tg is determined by equation (7), we see that the
proposed pro￿le of strategies is an equilibrium. To see that this is an equilibrium for an open
10set of parameters, note that the incentive constraints are satis￿ed with strict inequalities.
So setting pg with equation (6), pb = 55
51 and tg with equation (7), we continue to obtain an
equilibrium.
It is easy to show that in the current model it is the possibility of ￿rms behaving in non-
altruistic ways (i.e. having the choice between a good product and a bad product), combined
with the feature that consumers have reciprocal altruism, that gives rise to multiplicity. If
either feature is not present, there is a unique equilibrium in undominated strategies.
5 Conclusion
AA have argued that di⁄erent economic systems (for example Europe vs America) can be
explained as two di⁄erent equilibria of a model where the demand for redistribution is linked
to fairness. In this note we show that there is multiple equilibria in AA even when there
is no luck (i.e., with no unfairness). Indeed, multiplicity in AA arises not because of the
demand for fairness but because of the exclusion of the government from the de￿nition of
fair consumption. There is no easy ￿x: if fair consumption is de￿ned in the natural way (to
include taxes and transfers) then multiplicity disappears. Given that showing how fairness
can lead to multiplicity is an important objective of the literature on economic systems
that started with Piketty (1995) -using standard preferences- and which Benabou and Tirole
(2006) expanded using more realistic preferences, we provide a stylized model of fairness
based on ￿reciprocal altruism￿ (a la Levine-Rotemberg), in which multiplicity arises. In
other words, we show that AA￿ s key intuition (that fairness leads to multiplicity) can be
demonstrated, albeit after assuming a somewhat di⁄erent speci￿cation of fair preferences.
6 Appendix: Voting in AA.
AA identify as the median voter the individual with the median values of the shocks. In
general he is not. Hence, the tax rate identi￿ed by AA may be defeated in voting. Therefore,
we identify conditions under which the tax rate identi￿ed by AA is the one chosen by the
median voter (it is a condition on the symmetry of the shocks). Since the median voter
theorem does not apply (preferences are not single peaked), we now show that the tax rate
preferred by the median voter wins in pairwise majority voting against any other tax rate
(i.e. conditions under which it is a Condorcet winner). This gives conditions under which
the AA result is plausible politically.
11A tax rate ￿c is a Condorcet winner if for every other ￿; Prf(￿i;￿i) : Ui (￿c) ￿ Ui (￿)g ￿
1
2: That is, ￿c beats every other ￿ on pairwise majority voting. Formally, let f (￿) be the
density of ￿ and g (￿) that of ￿: Recall that ￿m is the median of ￿; and that the mean
and median of ￿ are 0: We assume that for all x; the densities of ￿ and ￿ are symmetric:
f (￿m ￿ x) = f (￿m + x); and that g (￿x) = g (x):
Theorem 3 Suppose the densities of ￿ and ￿ are symmetric, that the draws are independent
and let m be the individual with the median values of ￿ and ￿. Then, for every ￿xed ￿e; any
tax rate ￿m (￿e) that maximizes the utility of m is a Condorcet winner. If ￿m (￿e) is unique,
then it is the unique Condorcet winner.
Proof. Fix any ￿e; and let ￿m (￿e) (from now on, we suppress the dependence on ￿e,
since it will be ￿xed throughout) be maximal for m : Um (￿m) ￿ Um (￿) ￿ 0 for all ￿: All we
need to show is that for every ￿; Prf(￿i;￿i) : Ui (￿m) ￿ Ui (￿)g ￿ 1
2; and we will do so by
showing that Prf(￿i;￿i) : Ui (￿m) ￿ Ui (￿) ￿ Um (￿m) ￿ Um (￿)g ￿ 1
2:
For all i and j; and all s and t; we have that
Ui (s) ￿ Ui (t) ￿ Uj (s) ￿ Uj (t) , (8)
ui (s) ￿ ￿￿(s) ￿ ui (t) + ￿￿(t) ￿ uj (s) ￿ ￿￿(s) ￿ uj (t) + ￿￿(t)
so that equation (8) holds if and only if ui (s) ￿ ui (t) ￿ uj (s) ￿ uj (t): But then












(s + t) ￿ ￿i
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1 ￿ ￿￿e ￿
1
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Suppose, without loss of generality, that s > t; and let j = m: Since
S ￿ f(￿i;￿i) : Ui (￿m) ￿ Ui (￿) ￿ Um (￿m) ￿ Um (￿)g (9)
=
￿
(￿i;￿i) : (￿m ￿ ￿i)
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿e ￿
1
2




we only need to show that Pr
￿
(￿i;￿i) : (￿m ￿ ￿i)
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿e ￿ 1






To understand the following argument, note that ￿i = (￿m ￿ ￿i)
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿e ￿ 1
2 (1 ￿ ￿)(s + t)
￿
is a line through (￿m;￿m) on the (￿i;￿i) plane, and that the set in the right hand side of
equation (9) is the half space lying ￿south￿of the line. In particular, given s > t; if for
12agent i ￿i = ￿m; it means that i will prefer s to t (that is, will prefer higher taxes) if he was
poorer than the median agent (received a lower ￿i than m; namely 0 ￿ ￿i). We have that
for c ￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿e ￿ 1


















The symmetry assumption on ￿ implies that for z (￿) = ￿ ￿ ￿m; the density h of z is such
that h(z) = f (z + ￿m); so that h(z) = f (z + ￿m) = f (￿m ￿ z) = h(￿z):

































































[1 ￿ G(zc)]h(z)dz +
1 Z
0
[1 ￿ G(zc)]h(z)dz =
1 Z
0

















This completes the proof.
13As argued in footnote 1, assuming that shocks are symmetric ensures that ￿ = ￿￿￿m = 0;
which reduces the empirical appeal of the model, since the Meltzer Richard e⁄ect then
disappears.
Proof of Theorem 1. From Ug = ui ￿ ￿￿g, equation (5) and
￿
g = V ar(ci ￿ c
g
i) = V ar((1 ￿ ￿)yi ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Ai [￿ki + (1 ￿ ￿)ei])
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The best response tax is 0 if
￿ (￿e) =
￿2￿￿2
￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 2)(1 ￿ ￿￿e)
2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 2￿￿2
￿
is negative and 1 if ￿ (￿e) > 1. Hence, if the slope of ￿ (￿e) is less than 1; which happens
if and only if ￿ ￿
1￿￿￿￿￿2
￿
1￿￿ ; there is a unique equilibrium. This is the only relevant case
since AA assume ￿ ￿ 0; which implies ￿ ￿ ￿m = 2 > 1 ￿
1￿￿￿￿￿2
￿
1￿￿ : If ￿ ￿ 0 hadn￿ t been
assumed, and if ￿ <
1￿￿￿￿￿2
￿
1￿￿ < 1 < 2 = ￿m; there could be 3 equilibria, but the unique
interior equilibrium would be unstable.3
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